



People generally agree that uncertainty about
the future level of prices is undesirable since it
leads to a less efficient allocation of resources.
For instance, the more uncertain people are
about future inflation, the less willing they will
be to write long-term contracts or to make long-
term investments. In principle, the monetary
authority can minimize such uncertainty by
controlling inflation. However, what this means
for the actual conduct of policy is subject to con-
siderable debate. Some argue that for inflation
control to be effective, monetary policy should
be aimed at bringing the inflation rate down to
zero. Others argue that certainty about future
prices can be achieved merely by keeping the
inflation rate steady at its prevailing level. With
steady inflation, prices would rise, but the overall
level of prices still would be easy to predict.
This Letter discusses these two alternative
approaches to controlling inflation in the context
of the monetary authority's need to convince the
public that it is committed to that goal. This need
arises because policymakers generally have mul-
tiple, and sometimes conflicting, objectives for
policy. Thus, the public cannot always be sure
which goal has top priority, since economic cir-
cumstances, and therefore the priorities attached
to different goals, can change over time. This is
a critical issue since individuals' perceptions of
policy bear heavily on their economic decisions.
Therefore, the monetary authority must not only
strive for price stability (predictability), but also
find effective ways to let the public know that
it places a high weight on achieving that goal.
Multiple policy goals and the inflation rate
In most countries, controlling the inflation rate
is not the only goal of the monetary authority.
In the U.S., for instance, the Congress has man-
dated that the Federal Reserve conduct policy to
achieve such goals as high levels of employment
and economic growth, along with stable prices.
Having multiple goals necessarily limits how
much policymakers can do to reduce price un-
certainty, because achieving one objective often
requires compromise on another. For example,
suppose the monetary authority reacts to a sup-
ply shock, like a rise in the price of oil, by fol-
lowing a more stimulative monetary policy, in an
attempt to offset any slowdown in the economy.
Ifthe stimulative policy continues long enough,
it will raise the rate of inflation. However, since
monetary policy cannot influence the level of
output in the long run, output will eventually
return to the level that would have prevailed
without such a policy. Thus, in a world where
the monetary authority is known to attach a high
weight to stabilizing output, random shocks
can move the inflation rate around; this makes
predicting inflation, and, thus, the future price
level, more difficult.
With multiple policy goals, then, the predicta-
bility of future prices depends upon the priority
attached to inflation versus other objectives. In
addition, if a high priority on price predictability
is to be reflected fully in private economic de-
cisions, individuals must be sure about how
much weight is being given to controlling infla-
tion relative to other objectives. Individuals also
need to determine how much the priority placed
upon controlling inflation might change as, say,
the economy moves into a recession.
Historical patterns
Data for the post World War II period provide
ample evidence of how policy priorities can
change. Chart 1 shows that while inflation was
relatively low and stable from the mid-1950s to
the mid-1960s, it has been much higher and
more variable since then. Indeed, statistical tests
indicate that from the mid-1960s through the
early 1980s there was no tendency for inflation
to return to some level or even to a trend. Such
behavior makes it extremely difficult to predict
what the price level will be in the future.
In part, the apparent difference in price
uncertainty in the two periods may be due to
the nature ofthe nonmonetary shocks to the
economy, such as the oil price shocks in the
1970s. Nevertheless, we do have some evidenceFRBSF
Retaining credibility
The lowering of inflation rates in recent years
probably has convinced the market that policy-
makers place more weight on controlling infla-
tion now than in the late 1970s. Consequently,
We should have less price uncertainty today
than, say, ten years ago.
This pattern in priorities apparently was reversed
in the beginning of the 1980s. At that time, the
unemployment rate rose sharply and output con-
tracted, which led to a drop in the inflation rate
noticeably below the levels that prevailed in the
1970s. While the rate of inflation has varied since
then, so far it has not displayed a sustained
upward trend.
But, as economic circumstances change, the
public cannot be sure that the priority attached
to controlling inflation will not change. Thus,
while the market may believe that policy will be
less likely to allow inflation to approach the peak
levels observed in the early 1980s, there still may
be considerable uncertainty about the range over
which the inflation rate could vary. The fact that
the rate of inflation has been gradually creeping
up over the last few years also may be contribut-
ing to this uncertainty.
... Or stable inflation?
What if the monetary authority aimed at an alter-
native policy prescription-stabilizing inflation
at its current level? Part of the argument in favor
of this option rests on the principle that the de-
gree ofprice predictability need not be related
to the level of inflation. If inflation stays at about
the same rate, people can be confident about
the future level of prices in making long-run
contracts.
Under these circumstances, how does the Fed-
eral Reserve retain credibility as an inflation
fighter?
Zero inflation. ..
One answer is embodied in a House Resolu-
tion proposed over a year ago by Congressman
Stephen L. Neal, and supported by many ana-
lysts and policymakers, including the Chairman
ofthe Federal Reserve Board Alan Greenspan
and the President ofthe Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco Robert Parry (see Weekly Letter
March 2, 1990). This resolution calls upon the
Federal Reserve to conduct policy with a view
to bringing the inflation rate down effectively to
zero over a five-year horizon, and to maintaining
price stability thereafter.
In that case, many argue, it does not make sense
for the u.s. to incur the risk of the high economic
Passage of such a resolution would give Con-
gressional endorsement to a policy of trading
off some real growth in the economy in the near
term for lower inflation in the long run. Effective
implementation of the Neal Resolution would vir-
tually eliminate uncertainty about future prices.
Recent evidence to support this assertion is avail-
able, for example, in work by economists Law-
rence Ball and Stephen Cecchetti. They point out
that statistical tests on U.s. data reveal a positive
correlation between the level of inflation and the
degree of price uncertainty. Such a correlation
suggests that commitments by a monetary au-
thority to control inflation should be more believ-
able the lower it keeps the rate of inflation. The
Federal Reserve's support for the Neal resolution
last year, then, can be seen as a way of empha-
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suggesting that progressively higher levels of
inflation weie toleiated after the mid-1960s in
order to keep unemployment rates low. For in-
stance, the behavior of the federal funds rate
(adjusted for inflation) over this period has gen-
erally been seen as providing information about
the stance of monetary policy, with a low funds
rate indicating easier policy. It turns out that the
inflation-adjusted federal funds rate was notice-
ably low during much of the 1970s, and was ac-
tually negative for several quarters both in the
middle and towards the end of the decade.trolling inflation. However, it is possible to dis-
tinguish the two policies under some conditions;
for instance, inflationary shocks will call forth a
vigorous response from a monetary authority
committed to stabilizing inflation.
At this time, however, there is some risk that
inflation will accelerate. Thus, stabilizing infla-
tion in the current economic environment could
enhance the Federal Reserve's credibility. Even
so, any gain in credibility is unlikely to be per-
manent; sooner or later, when economic circum-
stances are more normal, the issue of retaining
credibility will have to be faced anew.
Conclusions
We have argued that uncertainty about future
inflation will remain in check if the monetary
authority is seen as placing a relatively high
weight on controlling inflation. Under normal
circumstances, a policy pledged to reducing the
rate of inflation should be more persuasive than
a policy of maintaining the current inflation rate,
since the latter cannot be distinguished from a
policy that would do nothing to control inflation.
Circumstances are obviously far from normal
right now. The price of oil has risen substantially
since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (even though it
has fluctuated wildly of late). The recession-
induced increase in the unemployment rate
brings with it the possibility that (as in the 1970s)
policymakers will switch objectives and tem-
porarily de-emphasize inflation control. Finally,
and perhaps most important, there is the uncer-
tainty created by the beginning of the war with
Iraq. These events have created the potential for
an increase in inflation. Containing inflation in
the near future may turn out to be a difficult task,
depending upon factors such as the price of oil
and the duration of the war in the Middle East.
Keeping inflation in check in the face of such
pressures will have the effect of making the






costs, in terms of higher unemployment and lost
output, required to bring the inflation rate down
toward, say, zero. This argument has some ap-
peal, especially because there is little evidence
to show that the relatively modest levels of in-
flation that have prevailed in the U.S. over the
past few years impose significant costs on the
economy.
Is the commitment convincing?
The problem with a policy based on the premise
that "it is too costly to reduce inflation today" is
that it provides individuals little reason to believe
that policymakers' would act on their commit-
ment to control inflation in the future. Individuals
have no way of knowing if policymakers will
ever be willing to incur the costs of reducing in-
f1ation: if it is too costly to reduce inflation today,
it will be too costly to reduce inflation tomorrow
as well. In other words, the logic behind accept-
ing today's rate of inflation would support ac-
cepting any future rate of inflation. Thus, such a
policy cannot ordinarily be distinguished from
one that would do nothing to control inflation.
The oil shock and the war
Under normal circumstances, it is difficult to
counter skepticism that a policy to hold inflation
at its current level is really a do-nothing policy.
If policymakers are not seen as making hard
choices, it is not easy to convince the public
that policymakers remain committed to con-
Consequently, it seems unlike!y that merely
pledging to maintain the current rate of inflation
would be very convincing to the market. This is
particularly true given the likely political pres-
sures that would tend to emphasize short-run
output and employment considerations over
longer-run price stability. The historical record,
which we have already examined, lends some
support for such skepticism. The steady increase
in inflation over the late 1960s and the 1970s
appears consistent with an acceptance of the
prevailing rate of inflation and an aversion to
imposing short-term costs on the economy in
order to obtain the long-term benefits of a
lower, more predictable inflation rate.
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